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Contractual Responses to the Common Pool: 

Prorationing of Crude Oil Production 

Overproduction is like the weather, ev- 
eryone talks about it, but no one has 
ever really done anything about it. 
[OilWeekly,May 20,19271 
There is growing interest in the role of 
bargaining costs in inhibiting voluntary con- 
tracts (Victor Goldberg, 1976; Oliver Wil- 
liamson, 1979). The theoretical work stresses 
the problems of heterogeneous firms, asym- 
metrical information, and sequential adjust- 
ment as economic conditions change. There 
has, however, been little empirical work on 
the impact of the number and heterogeneity 
of parties on contracting success.' This paper 
addresses that issue by isolating firm dif- 
ferences that lead to differing bargaining 
positions, and by showing the high degree of 
concentration necessary to complete con-
tracts. We analyze firm bargaining to miti- 
gate rent dissipation from competitive pro- 
duction on five common oil pools where 
contracting success varied sharply. On some 
fields, agreements were quickly reached and 
effectively enforced, while on others compli- 
ance was never achieved. We show the firm 
heterogeneities that led to different bargain- 
ing positions, and calculate the level of con- 
centration necessary for private contracting 
success. We measure concentration both by 
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the inverse of the Herfindahl index and by 
the absolute number of firms.* 
Three contractual solutions were consid-
ered to the common pool problem: lease 
consolidation, unitization of production un- 
der a single firm, and prorationing of field 
output among oil firms. In general, agree- 
ments for consolidation or unitization were 
not reached, and prorationing emerged as 
the dominant solution. Our analysis of pro- 
rationing contracts focuses on Oklahoma and 
Texas from 1926-35, a period when private 
and state controls were first implemented. 
The five largest fields discovered during that 
period are examined. The fields, their dis- 
covery dates, and 1949 cumulative U.S. pro- 
duction ranlungs were East Texas (1930,Ist); 
Oklahoma City (1928, 4th); Seminole Dis- 
trict, OK (1926, 5th); Yates, TX (1926, 14th); 
and Hendrick, TX (1926, 2211d).~ On Yates, 
consensus for prorationing was reached early, 
and dissipation margins were sequentially 
closed as they appeared. On Oklahoma City, 
Seminole, and Hendrick, there were partial 
agreements, and firm shares of the fixed field 
total were based on the number of wells; 
hence, dissipation occurred as firms drilled 
additional wells, and agreements broke down 
after short periods. On East Texas, field out- 
put limits were only effective during military 
occupation of the field in 1931 and under 
NIRA controls in 1933. Where private con- 
'These measures of concentration emphasize differ- 
ent aspects of concentration on these fields. The abso- 
lute number of firms gives the number of parties in an 
agreement: the inverse of the Herfindahl index shows 
the degree of large firm control, but is insensitive to 
large numbers of small firms. The inverse of the 
Hertinddd index is the numbers equivalent of equal-sized 
firms (Morris Adelman, 1969). For example, a Herfin- 
dahl index of .33 gives a number equivalent of three 
equal-sized firms. 
emin in ole District includes Seminole City. Earlsboro. 
Bowlegs, and Little River. See American Petroleum 
Institute, 1951, pp. 156-71. 
88 T l f E  A MERICAM ECONOMIC R E U E U '  	 M4 R C I f  1984 
tracting failed, firms lobbied for state en-
forcement, but again firm heterogeneities 
molded the final outcome. 
Other studies of prorationing have criti- 
cized the rules for encouraging costly over- 
capitalization, nonoptimal pumping rates, 
and small firm biases (Morris Adelman, 1964, 
pp. 104-05; Melvin de Chazeau and A. H. 
Kahn, 1959, pp. 150-66; and James McKie 
and S. L. McDonald, 1962, pp. 113-16). 
These treatments have focused solely on pro- 
duction efficiency. We show that prora-
tioning quotas were chosen to bring all firms 
into broad agreement, rather than to achleve 
minimum physical production cost. To  
achieve consensus for control of the most 
costly sources of rent depletion, concessions 
permitting less extensive dissipation along 
other margins were made. The provisions of 
the negotiated contract, then, while prohibit- 
ing particular activities by firms, set the lines 
along which some rent dissipation could oc- 
cur. Whlle the costs of the regulatory 
arrangement were high, our examination ex- 
plains these rules as optimizing responses to 
achieve at least some control of rent dissipa- 
tion. 
In developing our argument, we first de- 
scribe the options considered by firms to 
mitigate common pool conditions to show 
why prorationing was chosen. Section I1 pro- 
vides a brief theoretical discussion to derive 
implications for the empirical analysis in 
Section 111. 
I. 	The Common Pool Problem and Potential 
Solutions 
In this section we outline the characteris- 
tics of common oil pools and their impact on 
contracting: Part A describes the nature of 
the common pool and the costs of competi- 
tive extraction; Part B shows the link be- 
tween fragmented surface ownership and the 
concentration of production, the key de-
terminant of contracting success; and Part C 
examines the failure of consolidation and 
unitization. 
A. Characteristzcs of the Comnzon Pool 
and Costs of Competitive Extraction 
Typically, oil reservoirs are compressed 
between an upper layer of natural gas and a 
lower layer of water. The two layers, as well 
as gas dissolved in the oil, drive the oil to the 
surface when the surrounding formation is 
punctured by a well. Oil migrates to the well, 
draining neighboring areas. The extent of 
migration depends upon subsurface pres-
sures, oil viscosity, and the porosity of the 
rock. Reservoirs are not uniform; these char- 
acteristics differ across the field, generating 
inherent variation in well productivity. As a 
firm drills additional wells oil migrates more 
rapidly into the created low pressure zone, 
raising the firm's share of field output. In- 
creases in the rate of production, however, 
reduce ultimate oil recovery. With high 
withdrawal rates, the ratio of natural gas and 
water to oil produced increases, leading to a 
greater loss in subsurface pressure. Pockets 
of oil became trapped, and retrievable only 
with high extraction costs. 
Oil reservoirs are commonly found below 
numerous, independently owned surface 
tracts. The surface landowners initially hold 
the mineral rights, but transfer them to firms 
through mineral leases. By this process, mul- 
tiple firms gain access to the pool. Under the 
rule of capture, property rights to crude oil 
are assigned only upon extraction (Robert 
Hardwicke, 1935). Given migratory oil and 
fragmented surface holdings, each producing 
firm has incentive to drill and drain. Rent 
dissipation follows with high capital costs- 
duplicate wells and surface storage-and 
with reduced total oil recovery. Discussions 
of unrestrained oil production in the 1920's 
and early 1930's emphasized extraordinary 
wastes (George Stocking, 1925; John Ise, 
1926). The Federal Oil Conservation Board 
(1926. p. 30; 1929, p. 10) estimated recovery 
rates of only 20-25 percent with competitive 
extraction, while 85-90 percent was possible 
with controlled withdrawal. Excessive capital 
costs are indicated by the following data for 
the Hendrick field of West Texas. Dis-
covered in June 1927, exploitation was essen- 
tially unrestricted until May 1928. During 
that time, competitive drilling by oil firms 
led to one well per 10 acres at a cost of 
$57,000 a well when, given porous geologic 
conditions, only one well per 80 acres would 
have rapidly drained the reservoir. The asso- 
ciated loss in underground pressure forced 
premature oil pumping at a marginal cost of 
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Numbers Equivalent Absolute Number 
Field Landownership Operating F i r~ns  Landownership Operating Firms 
Yates 1.3 3.2 2 16 
Hendrick 2.1 7.5 3 18 
Seminole" 120.0 15.0 
Oklahoma City 20.0 2.0 
Source: OlI Ueekl,,, Oil ur~il(;cis Journul 
"Seminole City pool 
S.10 per barrel. Moderate withdrawal would 
have maintained pressure and allowed oil to 
flow without pumping until late in the field's 
life (Oil Weekly, March 23, 1928; April 13, 
1928). Competition for rents necessitated 
large surface storage. During the first five 
months of 1928, storage capacity on Hendrick 
rose from 5,251,000 barrels to 10,987,000 
barrels at a cost of $3,842,300. By contrast, 
on the neighboring Yates field where private 
controls limited production, storage was only 
783,000 barrels and cost $274,000. This was 
despite a larger potential and greater ulti- 
mate oil recovery on Yates (Oil Weekly, 
February 24, 1928; March 23. 1928; May 25, 
1928). 
B. 	Fragmented Land Ownership and the 

Concentration of Production 

The rent dissipation associated with com- 
mon oil pools provides firms with clear in- 
centives to restrict output. As we show, the 
number and heterogeneity of firms, however, 
limited the agreements that could be reached. 
The concentration of production was largely 
determined by surface landownership. In 
general, more fragmented surface holdings 
led to a lower concentration of operating 
firms on a field due to the leasing strategies 
of landowners and firms, an issue that is 
generally beyond the focus of this paper.4 An 
important characterization of this process, 
however, linlung surface holdings and firm 
'This phenomena is ob se l~ed  on maps of the five 
fields in the 0 1 1  lZ'eekl,* and Oii and Gus Journul, that 
ahow both surface ownership and operating firms. See 
011ur~dGus Journui, August 4. 1927, for the Semlnole 
Clty tield. Leonard Logan (1930, pp. 52-54) discusses 
leasing strategies. 
127 40 
42 7 
concentration, is that large landowners fear 
drainage to neighboring areas, whlle small 
landowners seek oil migration to their lands. 
Accordingly, all landowners prefer not to 
lease to firms operating on adjacent tracts. 
Landowners also protect themselves by using 
short-term leases that expire if production 
does not occur rapidly. Additional incentive 
to drill is provided by granting firms up to 90 
percent of the oil produced. The impact of 
fragmented land holdings on the concentra- 
tion of production is shown in Table 1, where 
the absolute number and numbers equivalent 
of lando~ners  and operating firms for Yates, 
Hendrick, Seminole, and Oklahoma City are 
presented. The concentration measures are 
calculated by acreage for the first date when 
such data are available. The data reveal that 
lower concentration of surface ownership 
generally leads to l o ~ e r  concentration of op- 
erating firms.' .4s we show below, the rela- 
tionship described by the data in Table 1 is 
not sensitive to the stage of field develop- 
ment. 
C. Information Costs and Contractual 

Solutzons to the Common Pool 

Three contractual possibilities are avail-
able to firms to mitigate rent dissipation: 
consolidation of production rights through 
purchase, unitization, and prorationing. Un- 
der unitization, production rights to the field 
are delegated to one operator with costs and 
revenues allocated among the firms based on 
their contribution to the unit. Consolidation 
50klahoma City is an exception hecauxe the Indian 
Territory Illuminating Oil Company (ITIO) acquired 
production rights to the area before there was indication 
of productive resenfes (011 It'cek!~.. Decemher 14. 1928). 
and unitization assign production to a single 
firm, which then has the incentive to maxi- 
mize field rents. Such agreements, however, 
are difficult to achieve because relative or 
absolute tract values for each firm must be 
determined, before production rights can be 
transferred. T h s  requires estimates of oil in 
place, recoverability, and drainage. Given in- 
herently high information costs, the impor- 
tance of oil migration for small tracts, and 
variation in field characteristics, these esti- 
mates are costly and subject to large error.6 
Hence, it is difficult to estimate tract values 
and to determine whether the contract would 
make all parties better off. These problems 
limited unitization and consolidation, as 
shown by the following empirical data. By 
1947, only 12 of some 3,000 fields in the 
United States were fully unitized (Joe Bain, 
1947, p. 29).' For consolidation, Table 2 
reports the numbers equivalent measures of 
concentration across time for the five fields 
in our sample. The dates selected in the table 
are based on available data. The data show 
that consolidation was not a general re-
sponse to common pool condit ion~.~ Indeed, 
the data reveal that the fields (except for 
East Texas) became less concentrated over 
time as new firms began producing on previ- 
ously undeveloped land. For example, while 
there were 6 firms on the Yates field in 
September 1927, by July 1928 there were 20 
(Oil Weekly, September 9, 1927: July 6, 
1928). 
The third option, prorationing, is a less 
complete but more flexible solution, whch 
allowed agreements to be reached. Under 
prorationing, all parties are maintained on 
the tield, and their output is controlled 
through simple quota assignments. Accord- 
ingly, once and for all tract values need not 
be estimated since no transfer of production 
"For example, a recent study of federal leasing showed 
that second place bids often ran 50 percent lower than 
the-\\inning bid (F.. C. Capen et al., 1971).  
,Elsewhere (1983a)  we examine the contracting prob- 
lems that limited unitization. 
"or Table 2 and throughout the paper, except as 
noted. \ve calculate concentration on the basis of well 
ownership, since acreage or  production data are not 
consistently reported in the Oil It'ec.klj, or Oli und Gus 
Jourr~ul. 
TABLE2-CONCENTKAI ION OF PRODUCTION T IMOVER 
Field Numbers Equivalent 
Yates 1.9 5.9 
September 1927 July 1928 
Hendrick 10.0 13.2 
September 1927 July 1928 
Seminole City 11.2 15.7 
May 1929 August 1929 
Oklahoma City 5.0 6.3 
Dece~nber1929 December 1932 
Eaqt Texas 64.6 35 3 
March 1931 February 1933 
Source: 011 W'eeklr,. 
.Vote: Numbers equivalents for all fields except Seminole 
Citb- are calculated by well ownership. For Seminole 
City, continuous well data were unavailable and output 
data were used. 
rights occurs. Shares are automatically 
adjusted as production continues; some leases 
are flooded by water, and production declines 
on others due to pressure loss. Such adjust- 
ments are difficult to achieve with unitization 
and consolidation because both alter the pat- 
tern of development from what would occur 
with multiple producers. Prorationing alloca- 
tion rules will be chosen to acheve con-
sensus among the multiple firms exploiting 
the pool, and not all margins for dissipation 
will be controlled. The types of rent dissipa- 
tion are determined by the quota arrange- 
ments. These arguments briefly explain why 
prorationing emerged instead of tract con-
solidation or field-wide unitization. The rest 
of the paper analyzes the determinants of the 
quota rules and impact of particular prora- 
tioning contracts. 
11. Firm Size and the Incentive to Restrict Output 
To clearly develop testable implications 
for the empirical analysis, we briefly sum-
marize the common pool problem when firm 
sizes differ. We apply a variation of the 
dominant firm model to a common property 
resource. This approach illustrates how firm 
size affects both the willingness to enter 
agreements to control output and prefer-
ences for particular quota arrangements. 
Firm i's profit function is 
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where p = the parametric market price, q, = 
firms 1's output, q;= output of other firms 
on the field, and C, (q , ,  q;) = firm i 's average 
cost f ~ n c t i o n . ~  
Oil migration leads to cost interdepen-
dence. Differentiating (I),yields the noncol- 
lusive profit maximizing output: lo 
where Q = q, + q; and S, = q,/Q. The firm 
optimum is where price equals marginal 
extraction cost, which includes both the direct 
cost of additional output and the increased 
cost of inframarginal production. As S, gets 
arbitrarily small. holding Q constant. 
inframarginal cost effects are completely 
external, and the firm produces where p = 
C,(q,,  9;). As a firm's share increases, how- 
ever, there is incentive to restrict output be- 
low p = C,(q,, g;)." Additionally, as shares 
increase, firms internalize more of the cost 
increases from rival production. 
The cross-unit cost effects from common pool 
production show why large firms seek to 
limit field output; however, if they unilater- 
ally reduce production, small firms will ex- 
pand output. Thus, as large firms cut produc- 
tion, they must prevent expansion by small 
firms. These efforts to restrict output are 
further complicated by oil drainage. Any 
firm's output depends both upon oil in place 
below its lease and drainage from neighbor- 
ing areas. Because of limited oil in place, 
h he model is a static one with the prirnary char- 
acterization. cost interdependence. For dynamic con-
siderations, see Paul Davidson (1963). While there are 
price effects associated with unconstrained output on 
the sample fields, those effects do not change the argu- 
ments presented here. For discussion see our (1983b) 
paper. 
' " ~ eassume that firms follow a Cournot decision 
rule under conditions of free entry. 
"Nonetheless. large firms will have lower direct pro- 
duction cost ( C ( q , ,q;)) for any level of'output (q:, 4,"). 
With more acreage and given that oil is not perfectly 
migratory, each well draws upon a larger effective pool, 
implying lower cost at any output level. 
small operators necessarily rely more heavily 
on drainage.'* Drainage increases substan- 
tially with higher output rates, and, accord- 
ingly, small firms are reluctant to enter 
agreements to restrict output, despite reduced 
aggregate production costs and potential 
increases in ultimate recovery. 
These arguments demonstrate the impor- 
tance of firm size in determining positions on 
output controls. To obtain the support of 
small firms in restraining production, large 
firms will offer small firms quota conces-
sions. Of the available options. only per well 
quotas provide gains to small firms to entice 
them into agreements, since they can drill 
additional wells to increase their share of 
output. An alternative allocation rule is acre- 
age, but this clearly favors large firms by 
eliminating drainage. A similar disadvantage 
exists for quotas based upon past output, 
which do not allow small firms to increase 
their share of field production under regula- 
tion. 
A number of testable implications directly 
follows. First, greater concentration of oper- 
ating firms on a field will lead to more rapid 
and complete agreements, since greater con- 
centration of production implies more large 
and fewer small firms. Second, per well allo- 
cations will be used on unconcentrated fields, 
while on concentrated fields acreage quotas 
will be used. Thrd ,  per well quotas will lead 
small firms to drill more densely than large 
firms to increase their share of field produc- 
tion. Finally, small firms are more likely to 
violate prorationing quotas. The differing 
incentives of firms to support prorationing 
and the corresponding bargaining conces-
sions mean that prorationing will bring only 
partial controls on rent dissipation. The ex- 
tent of uncontrolled dissipation will vary sys- 
tematically across fields with operator con- 
centration. We now turn to the empirical 
examination of bargaining for prorationing 
on the Yates, Hendrick, Seminole, Oklahoma 
City, and East Texas fields. 
12This technological effect is repeatedly descnbed in 
the literature For example. see Joseph Pogue. 1921, p 
32; 011Weehip Apnl20. 1928: 011and GUTJournal, July 
28. 1927 
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TABLE3--CONCENTRATION SUCCESS 	 OIL FIELDS A D CONTRACTING ON FIVE OKLAHOhlA AND TEXAS 
Yates 
Discovery Date: 	 July 
1927 
Numbers 
Equivalent of 1.9 
Firms Based (6) 
on Well (September 
Ownership:" 1927) 
Time from 
Discovery 2 
to Private months 
Contract 
Agreement: 
Time from 
Discovery 
to State 
Regulation: 
Effectiveness Full compliance 
of Output under private 
Controls: agreement 
Primary Acreage 
Al!ocation under private 
Rule: agreement 
Source: Oil Weeklr., selected issues. 
Oklahoma 

City 

December 

1928 

5.0 
(18) 
(December 
1929) 
1 
month 
1 
year 
Early compliance, 
with small lot 
drilling violations 
increased and 
state regulations 
were necessary 
Under state 
regulation. 
per well 
Seminole 
July 
1926 
14.0 
(27) 
(May 
1927) 
none 
completed 
1 
year 
Full compliance 
only with state 
control 
Per wellb 
Hendrick East Texas 
June October 
1927 1930 
10.0 64.6 
(18) (147)(September 	 (March 
1927) 1931) 
none none 
completed completed 
10 7 
months months 
Full compliance No compliance 
only with state except during 
control military occu- 
pation in 1931 
and the NIRA 
in 1933 
50% acreage Per well 
507. per well" 
" n ,  absolute number of firms shown in parentheses. 
hThe Hendrick and Seminole allocations were based on production potential, which could only be increased by 
drilling additional wells. 
111. Contracting for Production Controls 
A. Field Concentration and 
Contracting Success 
Table 3 outlines the concentration of pro- 
duction and contracting success for the five 
fields. The concentration entries in the table, 
measured by the numbers equivalent, 1 / H ,  
and the absolute number of firms, n, are for 
the first period when well ownership data are 
available. The table reveals a close relation- 
ship between the degree of concentration 
and contracting success. On the most con-
centrated field, Yates ( 1 /H  =1.9; n = 6) ,  
agreements on well spacing, total produc- 
tion, and firm quotas were completed w i t h  
two months of discovery. The initial quotas, 
based on a per well formula, soon led to 
overdrilling. The quota arrangement was then 
changed to productive acreage, and the 
margin was closed (011Weekly, September 9, 
1927; December 2, 1927). An umpire was 
hired by the operators to monitor compli- 
ance and to arbitrate disputes. After the 
Texas Railroad Commission intervened in 
neighboring Hendrick, Yates operators re-
quested state enforcement of their contract, a 
request based on fear of antitrust prosecu- 
tion of the private agreement rather than its 
failure (Oil Weekly, June 15, 1928). At the 
initial agreement, there were 6 firms with 
completed wells, and one, the Mid Kansas 
Oil Company, had 71 percent of the field's 
17 wells. A year later, Mid Kansas remained 
the dominant producer with 35 percent of 
the 203 wells on the field, and concentration 
remained high with 1 / H  equal to 5.9. Under 
the Yates plan, daily output was held below 
150,000 barrels, even though the field's daily 
potential reached 4,000,000 barrels in 
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October 1928.13 That restraint was despite 
low drilling costs associated with the field's 
shallow 1,000 foot depth ($15,000 per well 
compared with $57,000 on neighboring 
Hendrick: Oil Weekly, November 11, 1927; 
March 23, 1928). Moreover, Yates had the 
smallest surface storage investment of the 
five fields. 
Oklahoma City, the next most concentrat- 
ed field, had the next most successful early 
private contracting record. Bargaining began 
in December 1928, when the Indian Terri- 
tory Illuminating Oil Company (ITIO) held 
67 percent of the acreage (Oil Weekly, De- 
cember 14, 1928). By December 1929 the 
field was still concentrated (1/H = 5.0, n = 
lo),  and IT10 had 35 percent of the com- 
pleted wells (Oil und Gas Journal, December 
5, 1929). The first agreement limited the 
number of wells. The field's depth, 6,400 
feet, led to high drilling costs of $155,000 per 
well (Oil Weekly, January 10, 1930); hence, 
the incentive to restrict drilling. Further, wells 
were closed for fixed intervals to reduce pro- 
duction. The field began southeast of 
Oklahoma City, but continued exploration 
extended the field into the city. Much smaller 
surface tracts (town lots) led to rapid entry 
by small firms and declining concentration. 
Between December 1929 and February 1932, 
the number of firms rose by 57, and 45 of the 
new entrants had fewer than 5 wells each. By 
contrast, 6 of the 10 early producers had 
over 20 wells each, and the largest, ITIO, 
had 293 (Oil Weekly, December 5, 1929; 
February 12, 1932). As the number and di- 
versity of firms on the field increased, a 
consensus on private output restrictions could 
not be maintained and the larger operators 
petitioned the Oklahoma Corporation Com- 
mission to restrict output and prorate pro- 
duction (Oil and Gus Journal, September 19, 
1929). 
A per well allocation rule was chosen by 
the state in the face of large numbers of 
small firms. As with Yates, the resort to 
output limits helped to restrain early 
' 3 ~ 1 1  week!^. October 12. 1928. Field potential 
estimates for all fields are overstated because they were 
based on wide-open production by each well for selected 
short periods. If all wells were run continually, pressures 
would have dropped and reduced held production. 
Oklahoma City production and to limit stor- 
age (Oil Weekly, August 23, 1929). Daily 
output remained stable at under 200,000 bar- 
rels from December 1929 through June 1933, 
despite a potential of over 3,000,000 barrels 
(Oil Weekly, November 17, 1930). The entry 
of small firms led to increased violation of 
production quotas, and output rose, peaking 
at 324,000 barrels in August 1933 (Oil 
Weekly, February 6, 1933; March 13, 1933). 
Seminole and Hendrick were less con-
centrated than either Yates or Oklahoma 
City and had similar concentration and con- 
tracting records (1/H =14.0, n = 27 for 
Seminole and 1 /H  = 10.0, n = 18 for 
Hendrick). Neither field achleved successful 
private prorationing restrictions. At Semi-
nole's peak output of 514,000 barrels per day 
in July 1927, all firms were producing at 
capacity (Oil and Gas Journal, July 28, 1927). 
Moreover, near its peak, Seminole had a 
storage capacity of 3,000,000 barrels, over 
three times that of the larger Yates field (Oil 
Weekly, March 4, 1927). No constraints were 
implemented on Hendrick and Seminole un- 
til the Texas Railroad Commission and the 
Oklahoma Corporation Commission inter-
vened at the operators' request. State prora- 
tioning began in the Hendrick field in May 
1928. On Seminole, formal controls appear 
not to have been in place until August 1928, 
nearly a year after the first petition to the 
Corporation Commission (Oil Weekly, July 
8, 1927; August 10, 1928). As implied by the 
theory, prorationing rules in both fields re- 
lied upon per well allocations. 
Table 3 shows that East Texas had both 
the least concentration and the least success 
in restricting output through private or 
government controls. Discovered in October 
1930, the shallow field (3,500 feet) had low 
drilling costs (approximately $26,000 per 
well) and diffuse surface ownership that led 
to rapid entry by small firms and competitive 
drilling (Oil Weekly, March 6, 1931). By 
March 1931, the numbers equivalent based 
on well ownership was 64.6.14 By early 1933, 
'"ecauae of rapid drilling on the lield, the con-
centration wa5 calculated on the basis of ownerhhip of 
both completed wells and well5 being drilled. During 
early development. there were almoht no dry hole5 on 
East Texaa. 
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there were over 1,000 firms and 10,000 wells 
on the field. East Texas production reached 
738,035 barrels a day in August 1931 and 
peaked in May 1933 at 1,074,180 barrels. 
Rapid extraction reduced subsurface pres- 
sure, and lowered total recovery. Despite the 
costs of unrestrained production, no private 
prorationing contracts were completed. The 
Railroad Commission intervened with little 
success beginning in April 1931. The failure 
of these efforts led the Texas governor to 
close the field twice under martial law in 
August 1931 and in December 1932. State- 
imposed quotas were violated and numerous 
successful court challenges to government 
prorationing were initiated. Except during 
military occupation, the field remained un-
controlled until the NIRA codes were imple- 
mented and federal limits on interstate 
shipment of hot oil (oil produced abo~le 
quotas) were imposed. This failure occurred 
despite exclusive use of a per well allocation 
rule by the Railroad Commission. 
The most important feature in the success 
or failure of contracting was the degree of 
concentration on each field; other factors 
were not systematically related with bargain- 
ing outcomes: the two fields with the lowest 
drilling costs, Yates ($15,000) and East Texas 
($26,000), had opposite contracting results; 
Oklahoma City with drilling costs of $155,000 
had early production agreements, while on 
Hendrick, where costs were $57,000 per well, 
controls were implemented relatively late and 
only with state support. Moreover, size of 
field was unrelated. Oklahoma City and East 
Texas were the largest fields in terms of 
production, but their contracting patterns 
were similar only when concentration de- 
clined in Oklahoma City with development 
on fragmented surface plots. 
B. Firm Size and Support for Prorationing 
The theory implies that large firms will 
support prorationing and small firms will 
resist. The concentration data support this 
implication, but we also have more detailed 
evidence of the position of firms on pro-
rationing. Support for prorationing is evi-
denced by joining private agreements to 
restrict output, by complying with state pro- 
rationing rules, by promoting prorationing 
through testimony before regulatory agencies 
and legislatures, or membershp in advisory 
bodies for implementing controls. Opposi- 
tion to prorationing is evidenced by failure 
to comply with private or state restrictions, 
initiation of court challenges of prorationing, 
or testimony before regulatory agencies and 
legislatures against constraints. 
On the Seminole field, there are published 
lists of the votes of firms on early proration- 
ing controls. In May 1927, a meeting of 20 
Seminole operators was held to restrain drill- 
ing. The 16 operators listed in favor held 73 
percent of the wells on the field, and 12 of 
those were among the 15 largest firms by 
well ownershp (Oil Weekly, May 20, 27, 
1927). Barnsdall, the eighth largest firm, 
voted against the particular rule under dis- 
cussion, but the firm was active in other 
prorationing efforts. The remaining three op- 
posing votes were by firms with only 2 of the 
447 completed wells on the field. A prora- 
tioning advisory committee of 5 firms was 
established in August 1927 to restrict ex-
ploratory wells; the members were all top 10 
firms by well ownership (Oil Week&, May 
27, 1927; August 5, 1927). Later in 1928, 7 
firms agreed to limit drilling on their leases. 
Six were ranked in the top 10 on the field 
(Oil Weekly, May 27, 1927; February 17, 
1928). In 1929, 17 firms (of 34) voluntarily 
closed operations on Sundays to supplement 
formal controls; that included 7 of the largest 
10 firms on Seminole (Oil Weekly, February 
22, 1929; March 1, 1929; Oil and Gas Jour-
nal, January 19. 1928). 
On the Oklahoma City field, the initial 
drilling restriction of December 1928 was 
promoted by the field's largest firm, ITIO, a 
leading advocate of prorationing. Once con- 
trols were in place, large firms voluntarily cut 
production below their authorized quotas. In 
July 1931, 365 wells, nearly half the wells of 
the field, were voluntarily closed to reduce 
output; 212 of those were owned by 5 of the 
largest 10 firms (Oil Weekly, July 24, 1931; 
February 12, 1932). By September 1931, 
voluntary underproduction by large firms 
totalled 3,600,000 barrels; 71 percent was by 
ITIO, Slick (2nd largest number of wells on 
the field), Phillips (3rd), Franklin (5th) and 
Skelly (8th) (Oil Weekly, September 25, 1931; 
February 12, 1932). The record for small 
95 V O L .  74 NO. I LIBECA P A.VD W1GGI.V.S:C0MMO.V POOL C O N T R  4 C7'l.hTG 
operators is sharply different. Between Sep- 
tember 1930 and September 1932, published 
sources list 16 firms, all small, as challenging 
or violating Oklahoma City prorationing 
rules. Of those, only 2 had as many as 10 
wells, and the rest had 5 or fewer wells.15 
Through 1935, none of the 10 largest firms 
on the Oklahoma City field initiated court 
suits or was identified as producing beyond 
quotas. 
In East Texas, the division between large 
and small firms was similar. When the 
Railroad Commission began to regulate the 
field in April 1931, an umpire was chosen to 
set and police quotas; costs were covered 
through firm assessments, but only large firms 
paid (Texas Senate Journal, 1931, pp. 15-23). 
In testimony before the Legislature, 4 of the 
largest 24 operators on the field (Gulf, Texas 
Company, Arkansas Fuel, and Sinclair) 
offered to support any prorationing bill, re- 
gardless of its quota structure (Oil Weekly, 
July 3, 1931). Humble and Gulf, the largest 
firms on East Texas, attempted private en- 
forcement of prorationing rules by offering 
higher prices to firms that complied with 
quotas and by refusing to purchase oil pro- 
duced in excess of quotas (Oil Weekly, April 
24, 1931; May 29, 1931). By contrast, small 
firms opposed prorationing through lobby 
efforts in the Legislature. failure to comply 
with quota, and court suits. Their opposition 
to East Texas controls continued despite the 
use of per well quotas that allowed them to 
drill additional wells (Oil Weekly, July 3, 
1931). Of more than 50 firms identified be- 
tween 1931 and 1933 in court suits against 
Texas Railroad Con~mission's prorationing 
rules, or listed as violators, only one was 
among the top 24 firms on East Texas.16 
Small firm opposition is illustrated by one 
' 5~ io l a t o r s  of prorationing rules were listed in the 
Otl and Gas Journtil, Januay  2, 9, 1931 and the Oil 
week!^. September 12, 1930: January 22. 1932: Septem- 
ber 12. 19. 1932; October 16, 1932. See also American 
Bar Association (1938. pp. 175-211). 
I h ~ h eOil Weekh from April 1931 through December 
1932 contdns articles on court auits. Articles uith lists 
of parties can be found in the issues of May 22. 1931: 
June 5. 1931; March 4. 1932 and May 16. 1932. Some 
lists of court inlunctions againat violators are reported 
In the Oil Week/\, January 9, 16, 23,1932. and February 
13. 1932 
case involving 7 firms with combined hold- 
ings of only 94 acres, but daily production of 
50,000 barrels. Their production of ap-
proximately 500 barrels per acre per day far 
exceeded the field average of 10 barrels per 
acre, and was due largely to drainage. They 
challenged Railroad Commission quotas that 
would have reduced their strategic advantage 
(Oil Weekly, July 31,1931; June 5, 1931). 
C .  Concessions on Quotas and their 

Impact on Behavior 

While small firms prefer per well quotas 
because they permit them to expand produc- 
tion, such quotas lead to the overdrilling 
documented by Adelman and others. The 
role of quota concessions is clearly shown in 
the negotiations on Hendrick, Yates, and 
East Texas. During initial contracting on 
Hendrick, there were more wells on tracts 
operated by small firms than on those held 
by large firms: the numbers equivalent based 
upon acreage was 7.4, while for wells it was 
10.5. A major opponent of prorationing was 
Cranfill, a small firm with only 5 percent of 
the acreage, but 9 percent of the field's out- 
put (Oil Weekly, April 20, 1928). To reduce 
opposition by small firms, a quota was 
adopted based on 50 percent wells and 50 
percent acreage. Six months after the quotas 
were installed, additional drilling by small 
firms reduced well ownership concentration 
to 13.3 (Oil Weekly, April 20, 1928; July 6, 
1928; November 1. 1928). On Yates, the 
limited opposition to acreage quotas came 
from one small firm (Oil Weekly, December 
9, 1927). The firm, Simms, had 9 percent of 
the field's production potential, because of 
wells located strategically for drainage, but 
only 6 percent of the acreage (Oil Weekly, 
December 23, 1927; January 27, 1928). Op- 
position by Simms did not lead to a break- 
down of private controls. but when state 
regulation was instituted, a 50 percent well. 
50 percent acreage quota was adopted. The 
change from acreage allocations immediately 
led to the drilling of 51 new wells at a cost of 
$750,000 (Oil Weekly, May 25, 1928). In 
East Texas, there were no effective controls 
until martial law was declared by the Texas 
governor in August 1931, because of opposi- 
tion by small firms who held 85 percent of 
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the leases on the field (Texas Senate Journal, 
1931. p. 291). 
We have additional evidence from East 
Texas that per well quotas lead small firms to 
drill more densely than large firms. The quota 
adopted by the Railroad Commission in Sep- 
tember 1931 granted 225 barrels per day per 
well. Under that rule, small firms drilled 
additional wells and large firms held back. 
For the next year and a half, an average of 
110 wells were sunk each week (Oil Weekly. 
January 30. 1933). By February 1933, the 24 
largest firms on the East Texas field had an 
average of one well per 14 acres. while smaller 
firms averaged one well per 9 acres (Oil 
Weekly, February 27, 1933). The Cole Com- 
mittee (U.S. House of Representatives, 1939, 
p. 503) reported that prorationing rules in 
East Texas contributed to the drilling of 
23,000 unnecessary wells at a per well cost of 
$26,000." As the number of wells rose, quotas 
were reduced to maintain targeted field out- 
put levels. They fell from 225 barrels per well 
in September 1931 to 37 barrels by Decem- 
ber 1932 (J. H. Marshall and N. L. Meyers, 
1933. p. 717). Texas law. however, gave spe- 
cial quotas of 40 barrels to high-cost pump- 
ing wells, more than the quota available to 
free-flowing wells in East Texas. Accord-
ingly, firms placed pumping units on their 
wells at a cost of $3,500 per well to qualify 
for the larger allocation (Oil Weekly, January 
23. 1933; February 27, 1933; Railroad Com-
mission of Texas u. Rowan and Nichols. 107 
Fed 2nd 70). 
1V. Concluding Remarks 
T h ~ s  paper has examined bargaining 
among firms to mitigate rent dissipation. Be- 
cause of high bargain~ng costs, more com-
plete solutions, consolidation and unitiza-
tion, were not chosen. Instead. firms resorted 
to prorationing, and success varied. On Yates 
and Oklahoma City, where initial concentra- 
tion of output was high, early agreements 
were reached. Private efforts failed on the 
" ~ n ~ i n e e r stestified before the Cole Committee that 
3,000 wells could have draned  the field. While interest 
rates and expected price changes influence optimal 
extraction. they would not explain the drilling of 73.000 
additional well>. Clear:?, competitive extraction was a 
driling force in the decision to drill. 
less concentrated Seminole and Hendrick 
fields, though sufficient agreement was mus- 
tered to request state intervention to enforce 
compliance. On East Texas, with hundreds 
of small firms, no consensus could be reached 
on either private or government controls. 
Indeed, a major finding of the research is the 
high degree of concentration necessary to 
achieve successful coordination. Private 
agreements were completed when the num- 
bers equivalent was less than 5; state en-
forcement brought compliance when it was 
approximately i0--12; but when concentra- 
tion was less, state intervention could not 
control production without the use of troops. 
This is new empirical evidence on the con- 
tracting process- among heterogeneous firms 
and the Importance of concentration levels 
on the outcome. 
The analysis of contracting also shows why 
prorationing took the form it did. Adelman 
and others have criticized prorationing for 
encouraging unnecessary wells and have 
called for oil field uniti~ation. Adelman 
(1964, p. 107) estimated that prorationing 
raised production costs $4 billion annually. 
To require that regulatory policies fully close 
all margins for dissipation fails to recognize 
the high contracting costs for reaching agree- 
ment. We show that concessions, such as per 
well quotas, were required to draw in small 
operators and that the quotas led to predict- 
able responses regarding rent dissipation. 
Nevertheless, given Adelman's figures, it is 
extraordinary how much waste was em-
bodied in the regulatory outcome. 
Despite those costs, prorationing con-
trolled total field production and costs. Fur- 
ther. prorationing controls conserved natural 
reservoir energies and lengthened field life. 
On Seminole, state-enforced prorationing 
may have reduced early output by as much 
as 50 percent (011 Weekly. February 17, 
1930). Available data indicate that lower 
~\ithdrawal rates increased ultimate recoverv 
and lengthened the productive life of o:l 
fields. The prorationing regulations ex-
amined in this paper followed the major oil 
discoveries of 1926--35, which increased both 
the magnitude of the technological losses 
from common pool production and the gains 
from contracting to limit output. When 
private agreements failed, the parties success- 
fully appealed for state enforcement, and a 
permanent regulatory structure was estab-
lished. Erich Zi~nmermann (1957, pp. 
286-88) compared the productive life of 20 
fields in Arkansas. Louisiana. Oklahoma. and 
Texas, 10 discovered prior to formal regula- 
tion and 10 discovered after regulation.18 
After 15 years, output from the earlier group 
had declined to an average of 8.6 percent of 
peak output, while the latter group produced 
an average of 73.9 percent of peak produc- 
tion. The sampled fields in this paper are 
transitional fields where production occurred 
under both uncontrolled and controlled con- 
ditions. For Yates, Hendrick, Seminole, 
Oklahoma City, and East Texas, fifteenth- 
year production was 28 percent of peak out- 
put.lY In the late 1940's. industry sources 
cited by Zimmermann (p. 281) estimated that 
prorationing rules in Texas. Louisiana, New 
Mexico. and Mississippi annually saved the 
drilling of 100,000 unnecessary wells at an 
average per well cost of $100.000, a saving of 
roughly $10 billion. Thus, we see that prora- 
tioning was an effective partial solution to 
rent dissipation. 
Our examination of contracting has major 
implications for the general analysis of regu- 
latory institutions. Without recognition of 
the heterogeneities among firms and their 
impact on contracting efforts to increase 
rents. the observed prorationing arrange-
ments that emerged in Oklahoma and Texas 
cannot be explained. Similar heterogeneities 
influence regulations elsewhere in the econ- 
omy. Accordingly, detailed analysis of bar- 
gaining among firms is essential for insight 
into the emergence of various institutional 
forms. 
"~rkansas  and Louisiana adopted for~nal  regulation 
during the same period as Oklahoma and Texas (Stephen 
klcI)onald, 1971, p. 40). 
'"~aulations for the ratio of fifteenth-year (from 
diacover~) production to peak production were based on 
field output data from the M~neruls Yeurhook. U.S. 
1)epartment of the Interior. 
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